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by a motion to quash under the same rule."6 Although the term
"adjudication" encompasses many informal administrative
activities, 47 the request for an order requiring an eligibility list clearly
demands a higher level of action. Wyman-Gordon focused primarily
on the invalidity of the "Excelsior Rule" qua rule and approved the
requirement only in the interest of expediting that particular case. The
error of that decision is demonstrated in Delaware Valley Armaments
which transformed expediency into unassailable doctrine. Once the
Court recognizes that there is no "rule" requiring this list and that an
order requiring it can be issued only after a formal adjudication of
that issue, it will increase the pressure on the NLRB to conform to the
legislative intent that rule making be the primary means for the
determination of policy. The Board will then be faced with a clear
choice between conducting rule-making proceedings or properly
adjudicating the issue anew in each case.
Requirement of Notice and Hearing in Rate-Making Proceeding
In Moss v. CAB 8 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that certain fare increases approved by the
Civil Aeronautics Board, which the Board claimed were carrier-made
and within its power to allow,49 had actually been prescribed by the
Board and were illegal because granted without fulfillment of the
public notice and hearing requirements applicable to fare increases
specified and imposed by the Board itself.50 The petitioners, 32
Congressmen, had complained to the CAB on several occasions about
its practice of holding ex parte meetings with air carrier
representatives concerning the need for increased fares. Following a
series of such meetings the carriers filed tariffs with the Board,
proposing new rates to take effect after 30 days.5' While its decision
on these rates was pending, the Board held another ex parte meeting
with the carriers,5 2 after which it announced that it would hold a
46. Id.
47. See note 12 supra.
48. 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
49. See Federal Aviation Act § 1002(g), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(g) (1964) (if the Board does
not suspend proposed fare increases within thirty days after filing, they become effective);
Id. § 403(d), 49 U.S.C. § 1373(d).
50. Id. § 1002(d), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d).
51. The carriers were following the procedure prescribed in 49 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (1964). See
notes 64-68 infra and accompanying text.
52. Congressman Moss requested, but was denied, admission to this meeting. 430 F.2d at
894 & n. 12.
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public meeting on the advisability of exercising its statutory power5
to suspend the proposed rate changes. Petitioners refused to
participate in the hearing on the ground that it would be solely pro
forma. Shortly after the hearing the Board suspended the proposed
rate increases, pending an investigation. In its order, however, the
Board set forth in detail a new rate structure from which "anyone
could have. . . computed the acceptable coach fares"-" and indicated
that it would permit implementation of new tariffs filed in accordance
with this structure without exercising its suspension powers. The
carriers promptly withdrew the tariffs filed initially and filed new
tariffs based on the suggested rate structure. Petitioners applied for
reconsideration of the Board's order and opposed the new rate filings,
but the Board permitted the new proposed tariffs to stand and the rate
increases specified therein to take effect 56 On appeal, the court
invalidated the new rate increases and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Tariffs containing rate schedules must be submitted to the Board
by every air carrier subject to CAB jurisdiction.57 After a carrier is
operating and fares have been established, rates may be changed by
two methods. The first requires that the carrier file and give notice of
a proposed increase or decrease in any fare.58 Such a carrier-made fare
will take effect in 30 days unless the Board decides to hold a hearing
or to suspend temporarily the proposed changes pending an
investigation and hearing. 9 A third party may petition to restrain any
rate change thus proposed,"0 but the Board may dismiss such a
petition without hearing if facts are not stated which warrant action
or an investigation." Thus, carrier-made rate increases of this type
may become effective without a hearing, so long as they are properly
filed 30 days in advance.
53. 49 U.S.C. § 1482(g) (1964).
54. 430 F.2d at 896.
55. CAB Order of Investigation and Suspension, No. 69-9-68, Docket 21322 (Sept. 12,
1969), at 9 reported at 34 Fed. Reg. 14665, 68 (1969).
56. CAB Order Denying Reconsideration, No. 69-9-150, Docket 21322 (Sept. 30, 1969)
reported at 34 Fed. Reg. 15428 (1969).
57. 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1964).
58. Id. § 1373(c).
59. See id. § 1482(g).
60. 14 C.F.R. § 302.501 (1970).
61. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. CAB, 350 F.2d 462, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 945 (1966); 49 U.S.C. § 1482(a) (1964); 14 C.F.R. § 302.503 (1970). According to
Professor Davis, the CAB disposes of most petitions without hearing. 1 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.13, at 151 (Supp. 1965).
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The second method by which rates may be changed is through
Board action, taken upon its own initiative, although no carrier has
filed an amended tariff." After notice and a hearing the Board may
modify any existing rate determined to be improper.1 Notice and
hearing must also be provided if the Board has invoked its suspension
power." It is clear, therefore, that when a rate is Board-made, the
CAB must provide notice and hold a public hearing.
Whether rates are carrier- or Board-made is important for several
reasons in addition to determining if a hearing is required. First, if the
CAB permits new tariffs to become effective without a hearing or
without exercise of its suspension power, only a limited record will be
available for judicial review, making such review difficult and
ineffective. Indeed, in such cases the Board's refusal to suspend and
investigate carrier-made tariffs is reviewed only to ascertain whether
there has been an abuse of discretion s5 Second, the requirement of
notice and hearing in the rate-making procedure also affects the
propriety of exparte communications. With respect to petitions which
can be granted only after notice and hearing, the Board's rules
prohibit exparte contacts from the time of the filing of the petition;
with respect to other matters, exparte communications are forbidden
after the Board gives notice that such matters will be determined upon
a record after hearing. 6 But regardless of whether rates are carrier-
or Board-made, the Federal Aviation Act, unlike the Interstate
Commerce Act, does not provide for reparations by carriers in case
62. 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (1964).
63. Id. Under the APA ratemaking is considered a rule-making or legislative function, 5
U.S.C. §§ 551(4) & 551(5) (Supp. V, 1970), requiring that interested persons be given notice
and an opportunity to participate through "submission of written data, views or arguments with
or without opportunity for oral presentation." Id. § 553(c).
64. 49 U.S.C. § 1482(g) (1964). At the time of exercising its suspension power the Board
must indicate the reasons for so doing in writing. Id. Among the statutory criteria which the
Board must take into account when holding such a hearing, or otherwise exercising rate-making
powers, are the public interest in adequate service at the lowest possible cost, the character and
qualify of service, and the need of the carriers for sufficient revenue to operate effectively.
Id. § 1482(e).
65. Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466, 488 (5th Cir. 1967). Flight
Engineers' Int'l Ass'n v. CAB, 332 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Pan American Grace Airways,
Inc. v. CAB, 178 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1949). But see Trailways of New England, Inc. v. CAB, 412
F.2d 926 (1st Cir. 1969).
66. 14 C.F.R. § 300.2 (1970) (hearing cases; improper influences). Cf REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON REVISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, Resolution No. 4 (1970), which would expressly prohibit most ex pare
communications.
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fares are determined to be excessive or unlawful,67 a factor indicating
the importance of proper rate-making procedure.
Examination of the procedures of the Interstate Commerce
Commission are instructive since the CAB's regulatory functions are
largely patterned after those of the ICC.11 In rate-making cases
arising under the Interstate Commerce Act, whether rates are carrier-
made or Commission-made is critical in determining a carrier's
liability for unreasonable or illegal rates. If a tariff indicating rate
increases is properly filed by the carrier and permitted to take effect
by the ICC without further action, the increased rate will be legal, but
the carrier will be liable for reparations of excess charges if
subsequently it can be shown that the rates charged were
unreasonable; thus, the carrier's rates could have been legal but still
unreasonable.69 On the other hand, if rates are specifically prescribed
by the Commission, or prescribed to the extent that maximum or
minimum rates are established, such rates are considered
Commission-made, and the carrier is entitled to rely thereon without
liability. 70 In ICC v. Inland Waterways Corp.71 the Supreme Court
reversed a district court's decision and upheld the Commission's
vacation of a suspension order72 in which the Commission indicated
that the rates it was permitting to stand were "just and reasonable
67. Sections 8 and 9 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 8 & 9 (1964), provide
for the recovery of damages if a carrier charges excessive rates in violation of the Act. See also
id. § 304a (Supp. V, 1970).
68. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, insofar as its provisions for economic
regulation of carriers was concerned, was a substantial reenactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973. The provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act relating to economic
regulations in turn were patterned after similar provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. C.
RHYNE, CIVIL AERONAUTICS AcT ANNOTATED xiii-iv (1939). For this reason there was little
debate concerning the intent of Congress with respect to the provisions so modeled, and a sizable
body of case law was incorporated into such provisions. Id. at xiv-xv; see Aitchison, The
Evolution of the Interstate Commerce Act 1887-1937, 5 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 289, 304 & n.34
(1937). This is important because the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was not intended to be a
legislative endorsement of prior administrative or judicial decisions with respect to provisions
which had already been in effect that were reenacted in the same or identical language, but rather
"an absolute neutral factor in any question of interpretation." H.R. REp. No. 2360, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1958). Consequently, to gauge congressional intent with respect to the
Federal Aviation Act it may still be necessary to consider the provisions of the Interstate
Commerce Act and pertinent case law as they existed in 1938.
69. Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 383-84 (1932).
70. When making rates, the Commission is speaking in a quasi-legislative capacity. Id. at
386-88. See also United States v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 263 U.S. 515, 524 (1924).
71. 319 U.S. 671 (1943).
72. The ICC, like the CAB, has the power to suspend tariffs. 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) (1964); see
Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658 (1963).
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and are not shown to be otherwise unlawful. 7 3 Notwithstanding this
language, the Court held that the rates in question were carrier-made
and not "approved" or "prescribed" by the Commission, so that the
carriers would still be liable for reparations if the rates were
subsequently found unreasonable. 7 A similar result occurred in a
case 75 in which the ICC suspended tariffs which had been filed by
carriers but at the same time explained a plan of "carefully selected
moderate" increases which it would accept.76 These increases were set
forth in detail in an appendix to the Commission's order with which
the carriers, were left free to comply by filing new tariffs. 7
Nevertheless, the Commission made it clear that compliance with its
proposed increases would be "permissive in character" and that the
resulting rates would be considered carrier-made. 78 In Public Utilities
Commission v. United States7 9 another case involving facts similar to
those in the principal case, the court followed the precedents decided
under the Interstate Commerce Act. The FCC s° had held ex parte
meetings over a period of months with representatives of the Bell
System. Following these meetings the Commission issued a public
notice indicating that there would be major reductions in interstate
telephone rates. Subsequently, Bell filed tariffs complying precisely
with the rates indicated in the Commission's notice. The utilities
commission filed a request for rehearing, claiming that the FCC's
informal meetings had been a "proceeding" and that it had been
denied the opportunity to be heard in violation of sections 204 and 205
of the Communications Act.8" The court, however, upheld the
Commission's claim that the informal meetings had not been a rule-
making proceeding, inasmuch as the carrier was not required to file
the tariff in question, and held the new rates to be carrier-made, so as
not to preclude customers from later seeking damages.8" Other recent
73. 319 U.S. at 682.
74. Id. at 686-87. See also ICC v. Mechling, 330 U.S. 567 (1947).
75. Algona Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, II F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Va. 1935).
76. Emergency Freight Charges, 208 I.C.C. 4, 60 (1935).
77. 11 F. Supp. at 491.
78. Id. at 491. See also Birmingham Slag Co. v. United States, I 1 F. Supp. 486 (N.D. Ala.
1935).
79. 356 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966).
80. The statutory scheme tinder which the FCC regulates rates for wire communications
carriers is similar to those of the ICC and CAB. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 203-07 (1964).
81. Id. §§ 204&205 (1964).
82. 356 F.2d it 240.
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decisions8 3 have confirmed the view expressed in Public Utilities
Commission. However, part of the justification for these decisions
was that any person would still be permitted to challenge the
reasonableness of any specific rate that caused him to be aggrieved,"
an opportunity which would not be available in the circumstances of
Moss.
The holding in Moss v. CAB is a narrow one: that the CAB had
not complied with its statutory mandate to provide notice and a
hearing when establishing Board-made rates. It rests on the single
determination that the tariffs permitted to go into effect by the Board
were Board-prescribed-not carrier-made. In making this
determination the court first attempted to distinguish decisions under
other statutes and noted that under the Federal Aviation Act, unlike
the Interstate Commerce Act and Federal Communications Act,
there is no provision for carrier reparations in case of unreasonable or
illegal fares. This, the court claimed, made it especially crucial that
the public, which would pay the fares, be able to participate in rate-
making proceedings. Undoubtedly this distinction is a critical one
inasmuch as the rates of carriers operating under the supervision of
the ICC and FCC are subject to judicial scrutiny, 8 whereas under the
Federal Aviation Act the only remedy for the CAB's failure to
suspend a tariff would be to bring a suit alleging abuse of discretion.8 7
The court also suggested that the description of fares in the CAB's
suspension order was more detailed and explicit than in any prior
case, thus making this a clear case of prescription."
83. Alabama Power Co. v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 337 (D.D.C. 1969), prob. juris.
noted, 398 U.S. 903 (1970); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 338
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) prob. juris. noted, 398 U.S. 903 (1970); Florida Citrus Comm'n v. United
States, 144 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Fla. 1956), affd, 352 U.S. 1021 (1957); cf. Cincinnati, N.C. &
T.P. Ry. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 312 F. Supp. 972 (1970). But see 316 F. Supp. at 339 (Wright,
J., dissenting).
84. See, e.g., Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 390 (1932).
85. The determination that there is no carrier liability rests on the absence of statutory
language so indicating and a Supreme Court decision that the absence of such language in the
Motor Carriers Act precluded liability for reparations. T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359
U.S. 464 (1959); cf. National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90
(D.D.C. 1967), affd, 393 U.S. 18 (1968). This reasoning is almost certainly correct. See
Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, 413 F.2d 1401, 1406 n.8 (2d Cir. 1969). It is unlikely
that the omission of a reparations provision from the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was due to
oversight since one of the concerns of Congress in adopting the Act was to promote financial
stability in the commercial air carrier industry. See C. RHYNE, supra note 68, at 134-38. But see
The Wall St. Journal, March 2, 1971, at 3, col. 2 (Eastern ed.).
86. See 47 U.S.C. § 207 (1964); 49 U.S.C. § 9 (1964); id. § 304a (Supp. V, 1970).
87. 430 F.2d at 900. See note 89 infra.
88. This distinction does not appear valid since the rates in question in two lower court
decisions involving rail carriers were extremely detailed. See notes 75-78 supra and
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The court also attempted to distinguish Moss from Public
Utilities Commission and the decisions under the Interstate
Commerce Act on the grounds that the CAB was attempting to avoid
judicial review through use of its suspension powers, pointing out that
the Board's suspension authority is insulated from judicial review8"
and that an inadequate record for review had been produced. These
observations are correct, but they do not really serve to distinguish
Moss. The Board's suspension powers are no more insulated from
judicial review than are the suspension powers of the ICC or FCC."
Insofar as the record available for review is concerned, the Board did
hold a hearing regarding the advisability of exercising its suspension
powers, in which petitioners declined to participate. With the
exception of Public Utilities Commission, where there was no
hearing, precisely this kind of a hearing was held in other suspension
cases." Unless such a hearing were pro forma, as alleged in Moss, its
failure to produce an adequate record would not seem to be a
procedural defect attributable to an intentional attempt to avoid
judicial review. Finally, the court distinguished Moss on the basis of
the ex parte communications-the attempts to eliminate the public
from the Board's proceedings-a factor that indeed differentiates
Moss from all the cases except Public Utilities Commission.62 This
and the fact that reparations are not available under the Federal
Aviation Act, both important considerations with respect to the
protection of the pub'lic, are the two convincing features cited by the
court which distinguish Moss from the precedents under the Interstate
Commerce Act.
Because the Board is required to state in writing the reasons for
exercising its suspension power,93 a subtle problem arises. Such
explanation would in all likelihood contain some entirely proper
accompanying text. However, in the Public Utilities Commission decision there was no
indication concerning the precision with which the allegedly prescribed rates had been set forth
in the Commission's notice, 356 F.2d at 238, but even if there had been, such evidence would not
have been conclusive with respect to the detail with which the rates had actually been prescribed
since, as in Moss, it was not known what had transpired at the exparte meetings.
89. 430 F.2d at 900; see Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658 (1963). See note
65 supra and accompanying text.
90. But see notes 84 & 86 supra and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, I 1 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Va. 1935).
92. In Public Utilities Commission v. United States, there were also ex parte
communications. However, the court hinted at disapproval of that decision. See 430 F.2d at 899
n.33.
. 93. 49 U.S.C. § 1482(g) (1964). See note 64 supra.
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indication, whether direct or indirect, of the kind of fares that the
Board would consider permissible. Consequently, the court did not
say that the Board could not explain its reasons for suspending the
tariffs initially filed by the carriers but only that it went much too
far. 4 In reality a question of degree was involved in determining how
detailed an explanation the Board should have made for exercising its
suspension powers; the court, in deciding that the Board had gone too
far, determined that the Board had abused its discretion. It is
precisely on this point that prior judicial decisions differ.15 In making
this decision the court indicated clearly that it will look beyond what
an agency says it has done to what it has actually done. At the same
time the court attempted to demonstrate that it was not demanding
the impossible from the Board-a complete general rate investigation
before any action at all was taken. It indicated that action taken by
the Board on an interim basis would be sympathetically considered
and that its review of such interim action would be conducted on a
limited basis.9
The techinical holding in Moss, even though a question of first
impression, is of limited significance, for it applies to only one
agency97 and relies upon a determination that the Board abused its
discretion, a determination largely dependent on the specific facts in
that case. But despite the narrow technical holding of the case, the
court suggests that its opinion should be read more broadly. The case
presents a broad, recurring question which plagues the public
regulation of industry: whether regulatory agencies are unduly
oriented toward the interest of the industry being regulated.99 The
court condemns in sweeping terms the exclusion of the public from
agency proceedings and implies that it will not hesitate to use such
exclusion as a basis for voiding agency action. At the same time,
however, the court does not indicate any specific basis in rule or
statute for prohibiting ex parte contracts, at least to the extent that
they occurred in Moss. Thus, the court can find the CAB "guilty"
only of bad faith toward the public. 99 To this extent Moss is
94. 430 F.2d at 898.
95. See. e.g., cases cited at notes 74-77 supra.
96. 430 F.2d at 901-02. See also Bell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 209, 215-16
(S.D.W. Va. 1969), affd, 397 U.S. 818 (1970).
97. The court suggests that "a somewhat different statute and a different industry" may
make one case distinguishable from another. 430 F.2d at 899 n.33.
98. Id. at 893.
99. While a question of bad faith was not involved, the CAB has been criticized and its
decision reversed for excessively informal procedure on a prior occasion. See CAB v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961).
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illustrative of a growing judicial disenchantment with the procedures
followed by some administrative agencies. This attitude is reflected in
the increased willingness of courts to look beyond agency
explanations to find that efforts were made to exclude the public,'1°
that agencies attempted to evade judicial review,' and that agencies
exhibited bad faith;10 2 the trend is also illustrated by the increased
willingness to permit representatives of the public interest to intervene
in agency proceedings.ce To the extent that review by skeptical courts
exposes and curtails improper practices, this trend is unquestionably
salutary.
However, the larger question, whether such decisions have any
significant impact on the administrative process, remains
unanswered. A finding that an agency has exercised bad faith, such as
in Moss, has little precedential value. And it would seem quite easy for
the CAB to violate the spirit of Moss simply by not setting forth
specific rates in a suspension order, while continuing to communicate
informally with air carriers to whatever extent it felt necessary.
Moreover, there would be little a court could do about this, so long as
the Board complied with the statutory prerequisites and did not
violate its own rules. 4 Even assuming, however, that the agencies will
exercise good faith in following judicial decisions, developments
subsequent to the Moss decision illustrate how minimal the effects of
a judicial decision may be. The Board filed for a partial stay of the
court's mandate to permit the unlawful tariffs to stay in effect while
carriers filed new tariffs free of Board compulsion.' 05 After
considering the new tariffs,106 the Board suspended them all with the
exception of those which proposed continuation of the fares already in
effect.0 7 Hence, after 13 months during which the rates determined by
100. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, - F.2d _,___(D.C. Cir.
1971).
101. Id.
102. See Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 547
(D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Comment, Administrative Agencies, the Public Intent, and National
Policy: Is a Marriage Possible?, 59 GEo. L.J. 420, 44546 (1970).
103. National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 732-33 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Office
of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
1966). See the discussion of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., section V, infra, for an example of
increased agency willingness to permit public interest intervention.
104. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
105. CAB Release 70-102 (July 29, 1970).
106. CAB Release 70-108 (Aug. 19, 1970).
107. CAB Release 70-123 (Sept. 24, 1970).
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the court to be illegal were in effect, the Board determined that these
same rates were proper and should remain in effect. The Moss
decision and the events following it thus illustrate clearly that if
significant reforms are to be made in the administrative process,
efforts to achieve them must extend beyond the courts.'18
Compliance With A PA Requirements in FDA Rule Making
In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association v. Finch'0 the
United States District Court for Delaware held that regulations
promulgated by the Commissioner of Foods and Drugs for
determining the effectiveness of drugs had an immediate and
substantial impact on the pharmaceutical industry, requiring notice
and an opportunity for interested parties to comment before
adoption. In 1962, Congress amended the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act to require drugs to be effective, as well as safe, and authorized the
Food and Drug Administration to refuse drug applications when there
was a "lack of substantial evidence" that a drug was effective for its
predicated use." 0 Substantial evidence was defined vaguely as
"adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical
investigations, by experts." '' In September, 1969, the Commissioner
issued regulations detailing the criteria for "adequate and well-
controlled clinical investigations" and restricting the testing
procedures which could be used to prove effectiveness."' The
Commission was already empowered by the 1962 amendments to
remove drugs from the market for lack of substantial evidence of
effectiveness. The September regulations further provided that when
the Commissioner promulgated regulations removing drugs from the
market, the affected drug companies could obtain a formal hearing
only by convincing the Commissioner that the efficacy of the drug in
question was supported by "adequate and well-controlled
investigations" of the kind described in the same regulations.13 When-
the regulations were made operative immediately upon publication in
the Federal Register,"4 the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
108. In this context it is interesting to observe that since the Moss decision the CAB has
established a new consumer advisory council, the function of which is to advise the Board on
questions of public interest. See Washington Post, Oct. 22, 1970, § F at 12, col. 1.
109. 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970).
110. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1964).
111. Id.
112. 34 Fed. Reg. 14596-97 (1969).
113. Id. at 14596.
114. 307 F. Supp. at 863.
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